Abstract: Questioning the compatibility of Islam with liberal democratic principles has become a common argument in the public rhetoric across the socio-political spectrum.
INTRODUCTION
It has become a common argument in the public rhetoric across the West to claim that the Islamic faith is inherently incompatible with liberal democratic values, and thus constitutes a cultural threat to society and the political community (Cesari 2013, 6-7; Morgan and Poynting 2012) . Such allegations are expressed blatantly and overtly at the far-right political spectrum to legitimize an exclusivist 2 Islamophobic agenda. But they have also penetrated segments of the public discourse across the political and societal mainstream in many Western countries, where they are usually articulated more subtly.
Public opinion echoes this rhetoric. Significant parts of the population express reluctance to fully accept Muslims as equal citizens, questioning the compatibility between what they consider to be Islamic norms, on the one hand, and often blurrily defined Western liberal values (Stratton 2016) , on the other. Jones and colleagues found in their representative survey in the United States that almost one half of their respondents think that "Islamic values are incompatible with the American way of life" (Jones et al. 2006, 26) . A decade later, a representative Pew Research Center survey revealed that 44% of respondents in the US (United States) think that there is a "natural conflict between Islam and democracy" (Lipka 2017) . Attitudinal studies across Western societies, from Europe to Australia, have found similar views among substantial segments of the society (Peucker and Akbarzadeh 2012) . A cross-European survey by Zick and colleagues, for example, showed that in many European countries a majority consider Islam to be a "religion of intolerance," and only a minority agree that "Muslim culture fits well" into their country (Zick, Küpper, and Hövermann 2011, 61) .
Muslims themselves predominantly deny such a conflict between being a devout Muslim and living in a Western society (Pew Research Center 2006). Studies have consistently illustrated that the vast majority of them have no problem reconciling their faith with their civic identity in a modern
Western democracies (Jakubowicz, Collins, and Chafic 2012; Environics Institute 2016) , and a recent survey among Muslims in Sydney found that most of them consider Islam to be "consistent with Australian values" (Dunn et al. 2015, 30) . Empirical evidence even indicates that highly religious Muslims are particularly likely to regard Islamic teaching to be compatible with Western democratic values (Dunn et al. 2015, 32) or, as a recent US study showed, with political participation (Dana, Wilcox-Archuleta, and Barret 2017, 23) . Overall, most Muslims in the West seem to reject the claimed incompatibility of their faith with the normative framework of liberal democracies.
Where does the widespread accusation of incompatibility come from when most Muslims themselves disagree with its basic tenet and seem to demonstrate the opposite through their lived experiences as "ordinary," law-abiding citizens in the West? The most prevalent arguments revolve around Muslims' (alleged) stance on certain liberal values and freedoms, often in the context of gender roles and equality, the boundaries of free speech and sexual minority rights. Various studies indeed confirm that Muslims display, on average, more conservative views on, for example, the role of women, homosexuality, or abortion (Smerecnik et al. 2010; Environics Institute 2016; Kalmijn and Kraaykamp 2017) . These attitudinal pattern, however, often strongly resemble the prevalent views among other sub-groups in Western democracies, like certain Christian denominations (Adamczyk and Pitt 2009) or other "traditionalists" predominantly at the center-right and the far-right end of the political spectrum. These conservative non-Muslim groups (some of whom, ironically, tend to be particularly vocal in claiming Islam's incompatibility with liberal democratic values) do not face the same level of scrutiny and accusations of cultural separateness and incompatibility; their belonging and citizenship is not being discredited in the public discourse although they share similar views. Hence, it appears questionable as to whether Muslims' conservative stance on the unfinished project of progressive liberalism in the West (e.g., persistent gender inequality, anti-gay sentiments) offers sufficient support for the claim that the Islamic faith is inherently incompatible with liberal democratic values.
In this article, I propose an alternative approach to explore the contested terrain of (in)compatibility between "lived Islam" and democratic norms by focusing on a less attitudinal and more behavioral manifestation of being a citizen in a liberal democracy: Muslims' civic and political participation. Is there any empirical evidence that suggest that Muslims feel discouraged or prohibited by their faith to actively perform their democratic citizenship? Or does Islamic religiosity have no, or possibly even positive, effects on their volunteering in civil society and their political participation?
These are meaningful questions to examine the reconcilability between Islamic and democratic values as they go to the core of Western participatory democracies, which require citizens to care about the wellbeing of others and become actively involved in the political process. As Robert Putnam and others have consistently argued, it is not only political participation that is crucial for healthy democracies but also civic engagement and community volunteering that "makes democracy work" (Putnam 1993; Halman 2003) .
Given the diversity of Muslim communities in the West and the complexities of Islamic doctrines, sects, schools of thought and, above all, Muslims' individual Islamic spirituality, it seems, however, unfeasible to ultimately answer these questions once and for all. Instead of focusing on the Islamic faith as a rigid system, based on a literate reading of Quranic sources, which, like other religious scripts (e.g., the Bible), clearly contains norms that are hard to reconcile with modern democratic values, it might be more insightful to explore Muslims' lived religiosity in the 21 st century. The growing number of practicing Muslims who have pursued a political career in the West or become active in civil society, but also the millions of Muslims who participate in general elections across Western countries, for example, suggests that being Muslim is not an obstacle to active citizenship. For these people, their Islamic faith does not seem incompatible with democratic principles. On the other hand, there is no doubt that segments (supposedly at the fringes) of Muslim communities do pursue a rigid, sometimes 4 even aggressively exclusivist, agenda, advocating against participation in society and the political system of liberal democracies, rejecting the principles of civil liberties, equality and secularism as well as partaking in the political system of a non-Sharia based state. Groups, like Hizb ut-Tahrir, for example, have openly expressed their opposition to secular and liberal democratic principles, which puts their political-religious activism at odds with core values of Western societies.
Acknowledging this complexity across highly diverse Muslim communities, this article synthesizes empirical evidence on the relationship between Muslims' religiosity and their civic and political participation in the West. It argues that there is little support for the "divergence" allegations that Islamic values are inherently incompatible with, and thus hampering, active citizenship in the lived experience of Muslims in the West. To the contrary, studies found that Islamic beliefs and practices are often positively associated with greater levels of civic engagement and political participation ("convergence hypothesis"). In a second step, I discuss the findings of a qualitative comparative study on Muslims' experiences and motives of active citizenship in Australia and Germany, which offers fresh empirical insights into the different ways in which Muslims interpret their faith as a civic resource and motivational driver for their citizenship performance in Western democracies.
ACTIVE CITIZENSHIP
Active citizenship is a key concept in this article. While there is no unanimous consensus on what exactly active citizenship encompasses, the term is generally used to convey an understanding of citizenship that emphasizes the dynamic aspects of performative processes rather than the static aspect of holding equal legal rights. This is in line with the prevalent conceptualization of citizenship in contemporary scholarship as well as political discourses that highlight the procedural enactment of citizenship through civic and political participation in liberal democracies (Isin and Turner 2002; Bellamy 2010) . Such a notion of citizenship does not only reflect a specific analytical perspective applied in theory and empirical research, but also bears a strong normative dimension as healthy liberal democracies require, as many scholars and politicians have noted, an active citizenry. Sir Bernard Crick (2008, 18) , for example, maintains that "Democracy depends on all of us: the price of liberty is not just "eternal vigilance," as Abraham Lincoln said, but "eternal activity." Jan van Deth (2013, 9) puts it bluntly: "Democracy doesn't deserve its name without citizens' participation," and Chantal Mouffe has argued for many years along similar lines: "A radical, democratic citizen must be an active citizen, somebody who acts as a citizen, who conceives of herself as a participant in a collective undertaking" (Mouffe 1992, 4 ; emphasis in original).
Although the term "active citizenship" has become popular in research, it has remained conceptually vague. This article refers to a pragmatic definition proposed by Hoskins and Mascherini (2009, 462) in the European context: Active citizenship means "participation in civil society, community and/or political life, characterized by mutual respect and non-violence and in accordance with human rights and democracy." Accordingly, participation in the sense of civic engagement, as defined by Adler and Goggin (2005) , encompasses a range of formal and informal activities, carried out as member of an organization or independently, within the sphere of a particular community, broader civil society or the political arena through which citizens seek "to improve conditions for others or to help shape the community's future" (Adler and Goggin 2005, 240) . In principle, the possibilities of enacting citizenship are infinite as "activist citizens" constantly create new "scenes" and "scripts" for the performance of "acts of citizenship" (Isin 2008, 38; Isin and Nielsen 2008) , which has made it increasingly difficult to draw a clear line between community-based volunteering and political participation (van Deth 2013).
This understanding of active citizenship conveys a notion of civic and political engagement that is closely tied to the "democratic health" of a society. Without political involvement, even if this only means casting your vote in general elections, the legitimacy of a representative democracy is dwindling.
Moreover, many scholars, most prominently, Putnam (2000) , have made the Tocquevillian argument that civic engagement and community volunteering play a key role in maintaining and fostering citizens' democratic values, civic skills and social trust (Halman 2003) . Thus, citizens' active involvement in voluntary community groups is seen as vital for strengthening civil society as the "third sector," empowering citizen to take responsibility for their own concerns and to hold governments accountable. In Putnam's famous words, it "makes democracy work" (Putnam 1993 ).
ON THE COMPATIBILITY OF ISLAM AND ACTIVE CITIZENSHIP: THEORETICAL

REMARKS
Although this is not a theological article, it is worth presenting some brief remarks on whether the Islamic faith, from an Islamic theological point of view, constitutes an obstacle to active citizenship, hampering Muslims' civic and political participation in non-Muslim societies. Or, more broadly, in Tariq Ramadan's (2013, 163) Ramadan (2013) goes one step further, framing active citizenship not only as religiously permissible, but desirable and expected. This becomes most explicit in his elaborations on "action and participation" as a fundamental dimension of Muslim identity (Idem 2013, 195) . He argues that '"to attain to faith" is often, and almost essentially, linked in the Qur'ān to the fact of behaving in a good way, of "doing good works"' (Idem 2013, 194) , regardless of the environment or country one resides. This includes, among others, "to act for more justice within each sphere of social, economic and political life" and "to promote 7 solidarity with all types of needy people" (Idem 2013, 194) . Similar to March, Ramadan highlights that this includes both Muslims and non-Muslims. Stressing the interpersonal and social dimension of enacting one's faith as lived religion, Muslims have "the duty to strive towards participation, which clearly expresses the idea of acting with others, in a given society with fellow citizens that make it up" (Ramadan 2013, 195 ; see also Kazemipur 2017 ).
This theological snapshot confirms that there are too many different interpretations of Islamic sources, sects and groups to ultimately determine as to whether Islam per se prohibits, allows or even obliges believers to participate in civic and political life in the West. However, there appears to be a dominant reading of Islamic sources, even prior to the emergence of fiqh al aqalliyyat, that suggests that Muslim active citizenship -or at least certain manifestations -are permissible, if not encouraged by Islamic faith.
SYNTHESISING EVIDENCE: RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN ISLAMIC RELIGIOSITY AND ACTIVE CITIZENSHIP
What does empirical research tell us about Muslims' civic and political participation and the relationship between their faith and performed citizenship? While for many non-Muslim faith groups there is a broad consensus in scholarship about the positive effects of religiosity and, more specifically, religious attendance or affiliations on their civic and political engagement (Putnam and Campbell 2010; Verba, Schlozman, and Brady 1995) , researchers have long ignored the specifics of Muslim communities and the Islamic faith. This empirical blind spot has started to diminish, however, over the past 10 years, initially in the US and, more recently, also in Australia and several European countries.
In the US, studies confirm that Muslims are as often involved in volunteering and other forms of community work as the national average. Read (2015, 39) , for example, found in her national survey among 1,156 Arab Muslims that over one-half were "involved in school and youth programs and nearly three-fourth [were] involved in organizations for the needy -figures that mirror those found in the broader U.S. population." The Pew Research Center (2016) survey Religion in Everyday Life revealed that one-third of Muslim respondents had done voluntary work in the seven days prior to the surveythe same proportion as among all respondents and slightly above those without any religious affiliations.
The degree of Muslims' civic engagement in other Western counties is less conclusive. In Germany, for example, where previous research found below average volunteering rates among migrants of Turkish background (who are supposedly predominantly Muslims) (Halm and Sauer 2005) , 8 a recent study revealed that 30% of surveyed Muslims were actively volunteering, compared to 38% among surveyed Christians and 27% among those without a religion (Nagel and El-Menouar 2017, 25) .
In Australia, the official census data on formal volunteering show lower rates among Muslims (9.2%) compared with the general average (17.8%) (Peucker, Roose, and Akbarzadeh 2014, 295) .
However, there are reasons for cautious interpretation of such figures as the Australian Census defines volunteering in a rather formal way. This seems too narrow to capture the range of community engagement of many Muslims, who tend to "prefer a more informal and less bureaucratic approach to volunteering" (Madkhul 2007, 8 ) and often do not consider their ad-hoc community work a form of volunteering (Madkhul 2007, 27; Cultural and Indigenous Research Centre Australia 2010, 38) . This is supported by findings from surveys among Muslims in Melbourne (Monash University 2009) and Sydney (Dunn et al. 2015 ) that have revealed high volunteering rates among -predominantly very religious -Muslim respondents. Dunn et al. (2015, 37) found that over 36% of surveyed Muslims in Sydney had volunteered for a faith-based organization, 14% for a sporting association, and 49% had Researchers have examined the correlation between Muslims' civic engagement, on the one hand, and their subjective religiosity (e.g., personal importance of religion) or organizational religiosity (e.g., mosque attendance), on the other. In the United Kingdom, McAndrew and Voas (2014) , analyzing data from the 2010 Ethnic Minority British Election Study, found a statistically significant correlation between Muslims' subjective religiosity and both their civic engagement (e.g., in community or sports organizations) and volunteering in politics or community affairs. The more religious they were, the higher was their participation rate in voluntary organizations (Idem 2014, 111-112 ).
Read's US study on Arab Muslims operationalized civic engagement through various forms of secular community activities (e.g., volunteered for, among others, school or youth programs, neighborhood groups, or organizations that help the poor, sick, or elderly). She found that those with high degrees of mosque participation (i.e., regularly attending and very involved) were significantly more likely to be civically active (Read 2015, 41) . This association was particularly strong among Arab Muslim men. In contrast to McAndrew and Voas (2014), Read did not find a significant correlation between subjective religiosity and civic engagement. However, she emphasized that there was also no 9 negative association between both, which leads her to the conclusion that "Islam is not inherently restrictive of participation in American life" (Idem 2015, 41 ).
An Australian research team conducted a similar study (Vergani et al. 2017; Johns, Mansouri, and Lobo 2015) , following Read's methodology, with a sample of 96 Muslims from Melbourne. The results echo Read's findings: "organized religiosity (i.e., religious practices organized by religious groups and institutions) is a statistically significant predictor of civic engagement among Muslims in Melbourne" (Vergani et al. 2017, 73) . The correlation between Muslims' subjective religiosity and civic Another US study by Ayers and Hofstetter (2008) , based on a national survey of 1,846 Muslims, concluded that Muslims' religious commitment and resources (measured by their mosque attendance, prayers, and community volunteering) "was positively associated with increased political participation" (Idem 2008, 17-18) . This is strongly supported by the findings of another recent US study, based on a survey of 1,410 Muslims: Muslims who were very involved in their mosque were more than 50% more likely to become politically active (e.g., attending community meeting or rally, write to political officials) than those who were not involved in their mosque (Dana, Wilcox-Archuleta, and Barret 2017, 189) . Similarly, a Swiss study among Muslims of Turkish, Maghreb, and former Yugoslavian background found that Muslims' active involvement in religious associations (but not in ethnic organizations) has a significantly positive effect on their political participation (Giugni, Michel, and Gianni 2014) .
A British study confirms this political mobilization effects. British Muslims who frequently attend mosques are "more likely to engage in mainstream British politics given rates of engagement among British Muslims which are already high" (McAndrew and Sobolewska 2015, 69) . Ayers and Hofstetter (2008) found, however, that subjective religiosity ("religious salience") reduce their disposition to political participation: "Religious beliefs consistently offset the positive influence of religious resources," they argue (Idem 2008, 18) . What seems empirically well established is the mobilizing effect of mosque attendance (organizational religiosity) on Muslims' civic and political engagement. The role that Islamic faith (subjective religiosity) plays, however, remains empirically ambiguous in these quantitative studies. 
QUALITATIVE INSIGHTS: ISLAMIC FAITH AS A DRIVER OF MUSLIMS' ACTIVE
A research team led by Anita Harris, for example, interviewed 80 Australian Muslims in
Melbourne and Brisbane on their "everyday, 'ordinary' practices of civic engagement" (Harris and Roose 2014, 798) . The majority of respondents articulated a "special obligation as Muslims to help others or make the community a better place" and felt that "being Muslim made a difference to the extent or kind of social or civic action they were involved in" (Idem 2014, 808). Harris and Roose (2014, 807) conclude that Muslims who regard their faith as a holistic and comprehensive "way of life" tend to act as "ethical citizens whose everyday lives were always inflected by moral and political reflection and guidance for action. This could then enhance rather than reduce their capacity for civic engagement." Another Australian study on Muslims' religiosity and civic engagement (Johns, Mansouri, and Lobo 2015; Vergani et al. 2017 ) reaches similar conclusions. Based on 49 interviews and several focus groups in Melbourne, the research team found that many Muslim participants viewed Islamic practices and beliefs as anything but a civic obstacle (Johns, Mansouri, and Lobo 2015, 186) . To the contrary, civic engagement and volunteering was often described as being promoted or even mandated by Islam.
Overall, these study findings indicate that, in the eyes of many civically committed Muslims, Islam urges them to get involved in "active forms of community engagement and service" (Vergani et al. 2017, 72) . A clear distinction between religious norms, on the one hand, and democratic (secular) values around the promotion of social justice and human rights, on the other, is often hard to draw. 
THE SUBJECTIVE NATURE OF FAITH-DRIVEN MOTIVATION FOR ACTIVE CITIZENSHIP
The following elaborations draw on a cross-comparative study on Muslims' civic and political participation in Australia and Germany. While not being statistically representative, the study findings confirm previous research that highlight: (a) the basic compatibility of the lived religiosity of the interviewed Muslims with democratic principle of active citizenship and (b) the significance of the Islamic faith as a driver of Muslim active citizenship. But the findings add to the current scholarship by offering original in-depth insights into the multifaceted ways in which Muslims, who are active in civil society, community life and the political arena, subjectively interpret their faith as a source of civic commitment and active citizenship.
12
The data for this study were collected in 2013 through in-depth interviews with 30 self-declared Muslims who have been active in different forms of civil and political participation in Australia and Germany. The key goal of the study was to explore how and why these active Muslims have become civically engaged, and how their civic careers have evolved over time. The rationale for the selection of the interview partners was to realize a purposive sample that reflects the diversity of Muslims in terms of both demographic markers and manifestations of active citizenship. For the latter, a systematic typology of performed citizenship was used to capture a maximum range of activities, covering all of the following.
 Formal and informal political as well as civic participation.
 Civic/political engagement within an organization as well as enacted independently without organizational affiliation (e.g., online blogger).
 Volunteer engagement within Muslim community organization (from conservative-orthodox to more progressive-liberal) as well as non-Muslim groups (e.g., political parties, trade unions, mainstream civil society organizations)  Engagement characterized by a predominantly communitarian agenda (e.g., advancing Muslim community wellbeing) as well as pursuing "greater society" oriented (republican) goals (e.g., building a cohesive society) Interview partners were identified based on the researcher's previous knowledge of the Muslim community landscape in both countries and on additional online searches (e.g., for Muslim trade unionists, politicians; representatives of Muslims organizations). The realized sample for this explorative study encompasses all of the above mentioned manifestations of active citizenship, i.e., it included Muslims active within Muslim and non-Muslim community or other civil society organizations (e.g., trade unions) as well as within the mainstream political arena (e.g., active political party members, elected policymakers in local or state government). The majority of selected interview partners were involved, as it turned out during the interviews, in a range of different (often both Muslim and nonMuslim) groups and civic-political activities, most of them with a "common goods" oriented (republican) agenda; only very few pursed purely or mainly communitarian goals of advancing the wellbeing of Muslim communities. The sample was characterized by an even gender mix and a broad age range from early 20s to 80s as well as participants' diverse ethnic-cultural origins with some of them having migrated themselves and others born in Australia and Germany respectively.
Interview themes revolved around, among others, goals, motives and drivers of their active engagement in community work, broader civil society and the political arena. Participants mentioned 13 their Islamic identity and faith in particular in two contexts: First, a number of interview partners described it as one of their civic goals to redress public misconceptions of Islam and Muslims. Some of them had become active with the explicit aim of correcting the skewed public image. Second, and more immediately related to the argument in this article, the majority of interviewed Muslims described their Islamic faith as their primary, or at least a very important motivational driver of their active citizenship.
1
It is important to stress that this applies not only to those civically active within a Muslim community context and those who pursued a communitarian agenda of advancing the wellbeing of the Muslim community. But Islamic faith was also described as a key driving force of active citizenship by many of those interviewed Muslims with a more republican, common-good oriented civic agenda and those active within a mainstream arena of civic and political participation (e.g., trade unions, political party).
Interviewed Muslims in both the Australian and the German sample spoke openly about their sense of being empowered or urged by their faith to contribute to society, help the poor and needy, and, in a few cases, to advance the wellbeing of fellow Muslims. On closer inspection, these personal accounts offer unprecedented insights into the different ways in which the Islamic faith serves as a civic motivational force. The data analysis, which did not pinpoint any major country-specific differences between Muslims in Australia and Germany, identified three often overlapping and interconnected arguments. First, Islam was described as a general source of strength and empowerment facilitating civic engagement; second, some interview partners regarded "serving others" as an inherent principle of lived religiosity in Islam; and third, many described active citizenship -sometimes rather defensively -as an act their faith obliges them to perform and they will be rewarded for by God. 
Empowerment and Strength
Several respondents elaborated that their
Serving Humanity as a Principle of Lived Religiosity
A number of interview partners explained their faith-driven motivation for their civic engagement and commitment in spiritual terms and with a reference to the fundamental nature of Islam -importantly, though, without mentioning a sense of obligation. A Melbourne volunteer (35/f) for a Muslim women's organization, for example, stated that helping and "being useful to others," both Muslims and nonMuslims, is "such a strong concept in Islam" -and her civic engagement is a reflection of this: "This is how I emanate that, this is how I show that -being a useful human being." Another community activist from Melbourne (41/f) argued similarly. Her commitment to "serving humanity" and "her deep concern for humanity as a whole" is fundamentally driven by her endeavors to follow the example of the Prophet. For her, active engagement in cross-community dialogue and serving others is "the main path to connect with the Divine." She said:
… the purpose of life is to know God. But how do we know God? Do you know God just through praying … or fasting? You know God through his divine attributes … God's attributes are such as the all merciful, the compassionate, the all loving, the all forgiving (41/f).
There was no sense of religious obligation in the description of her motivation: "It's definitely my Another interview partner in the German sample, a civically and politically active university student (21/m), similarly argued along religious lines, comparing these Islamic norms with humanistic principles. He stated: "Well, the motivation why I do all this has, of course, a religious background," emphasizing that for him Islamic norms are identical with humanistic values. While he maintains that this is "something my religion wants" and that one will be rewarded for it, he also stressed his personal and deeply religious motivation by saying that "for me it is important to give, but what makes this important is that it is linked to God. The spirituality is very important." Another interviewed Muslim in Germany (27/f), who has been active within a socialist youth group and Muslim community organization as well as in the local political arena, explained the driver behind her volunteering as being "part of living my religion. For me that's not only praying, but being active, doing something for other people. That for me is about religion … It's kind of worship to be there for society."
What these accounts have in common is that their civic engagement, striving for the wellbeing of others regardless of their religion, is portrayed as being inherent in their lived religiosity. It is not, or at least not primarily, described as a religious obligation -despite occasional references to God's reward.
In some cases, however, it appears difficult to clearly distinguish between this rather spiritual enactment of Islamic principles and a sense of religious duty. A Muslim university student from Sydney (28/m), active within a Muslim-led initiative that help socio-economically marginalized at-risk youth (e.g., drug use, criminality) in the local neighborhood, also framed the motives for his civic engagement in religious terms, referring to the Quranic verse "If you save one life, it is as if you saved all humanity." He explains that his faith "teaches [him] to do this and to have passion, to be compassionate" and that "our Lord has instructed us to help the disadvantaged and give where you can." The latter suggest a sense of religious obligation. He makes this more explicit during the interview when he mentioned that compassion is "intrinsically in me," but "as a natural consequence of that," he also seeks to gain credits for his good deeds to be rewarded by God in the afterlife.
Citizenship as a Religious Duty
Many interviewed Muslims mentioned this notion of collecting point or credits by doing good deeds in this life, which would be rewarded by God in the hereafter. But this Islamic "reward system" and the motivation to please God through active contribution to the wellbeing of others was interpreted in different ways. This ranged from an almost instrumentalist and sometimes rigid notion of following religious duties to a more flexible understanding of the Islamic principle of "doing good."
A Sydney-based Muslim community activist (55/f), who has also been involved in a range of political advisory activities on local, state and national level, for example, stated that to please God you need to be "doing as best you can." She alludes to the divine reward that drives her manifold civic there is always this fear that, maybe, you are not fulfilling it. That drives me and pushes me to work a lot." Despite this "fear," he emphasized the pleasure he gets out of doing community work: I really enjoy it, the people and the community, but there is the doubt whether it is enough and sufficient, whether your intentions are clean … It comes in as a doubt, but the engagement itself is very positive. I don't do it as a burden (28/m).
A few interview partners interpreted this religious duty in a more defensive or instrumentalist way. A woman from Sydney (25/f), community engagement officer for a government-led initiative, described defending God and helping other Muslims as an "informal" obligation, referring to the Islamic reward system: Everything I do is to get into heaven. That's essentially every Muslim's goal, every religious person's goal … It is definitely to score more points. I want God to see I'm doing this for his benefit and the benefit of our religion. And I'm trying to abide by this as much as I can. And it is always my end goal … to please God and not anybody else
Similarly, in the German sample, a long-standing Muslim community activist (47/f) stated that her community and interfaith work is about "paying her duty to thank the Creator for being healthy and well, and that my children are well. It is my duty to do this, collecting a few points … I do this in order to stay well in the future." And she continued:
The driving force for doing all this -sacrificing one's own time, staying away from home sometimes on weekends, although your children need you -is of course God's benevolence … One collects good deeds, which you need in this life and in the afterlife (47/f).
Such a rather defensive interpretation of the Islamic obligation of helping the needy and contributing to society was an exception in this study. It was much more common among the interviewed Muslims to elaborate on how their civic engagement has given them personal pleasure and a sense of purpose and meaning in their life. The notion of gaining points or credits for one's good acts to be rewarded by God in the afterlife was prominent among many interviewed Muslims. Civic engagement was, however, not merely a dutiful act before God, but rather a core aspect of one's subjective religiosity that is experienced not alone through formal religious acts like praying and fasting, but in a holistic "comprehensive way of life," as one interview partner described it. Recent quantitative studies (Jamal 2005; Fleischmann, Martinovic, and Böhm. 2016; Read 2015) have consistently shown that Muslims who regularly attend and are active within mosques are significantly more likely to be also engaged in other non-Muslim civil society groups. In addition, this organizational facet of their religiosity has often been linked to increased political activism and trust (Fleischmann, 
